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ABSTRACT 
This paper retraces and analyses the development of British economic intelligence at the end of 
World War II. It will be argued that the re-organisation of the economic intelligence apparatus taking 
place in 1944 and 1945 has to be seen in the context of the “Cold War in Whitehall”, the debate 
between the Foreign Office and the Chiefs of Staff concerning the post-war international order and 
the future role and behaviour of the Soviet Union. The paper argues that the diplomats were able to 
gain control of the economic intelligence apparatus and used it to support them in the assumptions 
debate.   
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Economic Intelligence [is] a gentlemanly 
form of spying 
 – John Colville 
 
Introduction 
Although economic intelligence is often considered a very recent addition to the intelligence 
repertoire1, its roots can be traced back to biblical times: When the Israelites sent forth by 
Moses to “spy out the land”, and determine its wealth and the quality of its soils, reported 
that Canaan was indeed a rich country where milk and honey flowed, they delivered an early 
example of economic intelligence2.  
During World War II, over 3,000 years later, intelligence was again employed to discern the 
enemy’s economic dispositions, to determine his military potential, and, thus, to support the 
war effort. Inter alia, economic intelligence provided information about the enemy’s 
strategic decisions, and was used to select targets for the Allied strategic bombing campaign, 
as well as being an essential prerequisite for the economic blockade of the continent. During 
the war, both the size and the scope of economic intelligence increased considerably, 
turning the pre-war “bantam […] into an enormous fowl”3. Moreover, economic intelligence 
promised to be of great help in the post-war world, where economic issues were likely to 
take a prominent place in political negotiations, a view reflected in a debate in the House of 
Lords on 9 May 1944, when it was asserted that “quite apart from the manifold uses of the 
economic intelligence for fighting the war, economic intelligence is of vital importance for 
the planning of many operations which will follow the defeat of Germany.”4 Thus, towards 
                                                          
1
 Cf. Stansfield Turner, ‘Intelligence for a New World Order’, Foreign Affairs 70:4 (1991), 150-166.  
2
 Cf. Numbers, 13:2-13:27. 
3
 Watson to Morton, 18 Aug. 1944, PREM 7/14, TNA. 
4
 House of Lords Debate, 9 May 1944, in: Hansard, Fifth Series (Lords), Vol. 131 (1944), 627-670; here: 643. 
Diplomats, Officers, and the Gentlemanly Form of Spying 
Economic Intelligence at the End of World War II 
3 
 
the end of the war, the necessity to procure good economic intelligence – to borrow from 
George Washington – had become apparent and needed not be further urged5. 
What was not so apparent, however, was the shape the post-war world would be taking. 
This question led to the “Cold War in Whitehall”6 (henceforth referred to as the 
“assumptions debate”), an intense debate about the likely shape of the post-war 
international order – and particularly about the future behaviour and role of the Soviet 
Union: From 1943 onwards, the Chiefs of Staff predicted that the Soviets were bound to be 
Britain’s future enemy, whilst the Foreign Office believed that good relations with the Soviet 
Union could be maintained and that post-war problems could be resolved by co-operation. 
Consequently, the Foreign Office proposed a rigorous approach towards Germany, both to 
prevent her from becoming aggressive again, and to convince the Soviet leaders of the 
sincerity of British policy, whereas the military argued that Germany should be kept strong in 
order to serve as a bulwark against an expected Soviet expansionism. The ensuing quarrel 
was prolonged and bitter, with both sides seeking to re-align the British posture and policy 
to best befit their envisaged scenario. And, as Richard Aldrich has shown, “intelligence and 
special operations were at the heart of this protracted struggle and, ultimately, determined 
the very architecture of the British Cold War machine itself”7.  
This paper argues that the development and re-organisation of economic intelligence in 
1944 and early 1945 also has to be put into the context of the assumptions debate, thus, 
adding another dimension to the struggle for intelligence identified by Aldrich. It will be 
argued that economic intelligence played an important and distinct role therein, and, 
moreover, that it ultimately did so in favour of the Foreign Office. 
                                                          
5
 For Washington’s original quote, cf. Christopher Andrew, For the President’s Eyes Only, New York 1995, 9. 
6
 Cf. Richard Aldrich, The Hidden Hand. Britain, American and Cold War Secret Intelligence, New York 2001, 43ff. 
7
 Ibid. 44. 
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In order to put forward this argument, this paper aims to describe and analyse the 
development of economic intelligence during the last two years of the war – a task that has 
not yet been carried out elsewhere – as well as retracing the assumptions debate and the 
struggle for intelligence estimates, and subsequently show the interaction of the two8.  
Consequently, the paper will be divided into three sections, the first two of them providing 
the essential basis for the core argument presented in the third section: The first section will 
retrace the “Cold War in Whitehall” and show the role played by intelligence therein, 
followed by a second section describing the genesis and development of economic 
intelligence in World War II. Apart from providing another essential background for the 
overall argument, it will show that economic intelligence developed a very close working-
relationship with the Armed Services during the first four years of the war. This will serve as 
a contrast to the subsequent – and last – section which will focus on the re-organisation of 
economic intelligence and its employment by the Foreign Office in their debate with the 
Chiefs of Staff. It will be argued that the re-organisation took place in two phases: In the first 
phase, the Foreign Office assumed control of the economic intelligence machinery and used 
it directly in the assumptions debate. In the second phase, the economic intelligence 
apparatus was dismantled and distributed among those government bodies that acted in 
accordance with the policy envisaged by the diplomats. 
Intelligence has been described as a “missing dimension” to the study of international 
affairs9, and Martin Alexander has referred to economic intelligence as the “missing 
                                                          
8
 This paper will not attempt to determine whose assumptions were correct – a question that has led to a 
considerable debate among ‘orthodox’, ‘revisionist’ and ‘post-revisionist’ historians – but simply show what 
each side’s assumptions were and how the assumptions debate proceeded. 
9
 Cf. Christopher Andrew/David Dilks (eds), The Missing Dimension: Governments and Intelligence Communities 
in the Twentieth Century, London 1984, 1.  
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dimension to [this] missing dimension.”10 These statements are clearly justified given the 
scarcity of scholarly works concerned with the central subject of this paper: Whereas at least 
a number of works on pre-war economic intelligence have been published11, the sole 
existing study specially dedicated to war-time economic intelligence12 is limited to the time 
period of the drôle de guerre, from September 1939 until mid-1940. Even the official history 
of the economic blockade, an endeavour closely related to economic intelligence, only 
mentions the subject in passing13. F.H. Hinsley’s official history of British Intelligence in the 
Second World War does devote two chapters (out of 63) to Intelligence on the German 
Economy14. Although this provides valuable information regarding the impact of economic 
intelligence on the war effort, it only covers the period until June 1944 and leaves out 
organisational aspects.  
Given the scarcity of relevant literature on economic intelligence, especially during the 
period under scrutiny, a considerable part of this paper will, therefore, be based on 
documents from the files of the Prime Minister’s Office (PREM), the Cabinet Office (CAB) and 
the Foreign Office (FO), all found at The National Archives in Kew, Surrey. These documents 
will be complemented by the existing body of secondary literature on the role of intelligence 
during World War II as well as on the assumptions debate. An importance additional source 
for the latter aspect are the diaries of protagonists involved in the debate which, unlike the 
                                                          
10
 Martin Alexander, 'Introduction: Knowing Your Friends, Assessing Your Allies - Perspectives on Intra-Alliance 
Intelligence', Intelligence & National Security 13:1 (1998), 1-17; here: 7. 
11
 Cf., for example, David Cameron Watt, 'British Intelligence and the Coming of the Second World War in 
Europe', in: Ernest May (ed.), Knowing One's Enemies: Intelligence Assessments before the Two World Wars, 
Princeton 1986; or: Robert Young, 'Spokesmen for Economic Warfare: The Industrial Intelligence Centre in the 
1930s', European Studies Review 6 (1976), 473-89. 
12
 Talbot Imlay, 'Allied Economic Intelligence and Strategy during the 'Phoney War'', Intelligence & National 
Security 13:4 (1998), 107-23. 
13
 W.N. Medlicott, The Economic Blockade, II Vols, London 1952/1959.  
14
 F.H. Hinsley et al., British Intelligence in the Second World War, IV Vols., London, 1979-1990. 
Diplomats, Officers, and the Gentlemanly Form of Spying 
Economic Intelligence at the End of World War II 
6 
 
plethora of memoirs reflecting on these issues, tend not to be tainted by a posteriori 
insights15. 
This paper will concentrate on the organisational aspect of the analysis and dissemination of 
economic intelligence, leaving out another stage of the intelligence process, the acquisition 
of relevant information by an intelligence organisation16. This work was predominantly 
carried out by Section VI of the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) and remained unchanged 
throughout the war, little affected by the re-organisation of the rest of the economic 
intelligence apparatus. The incorporation of this aspect would, thus, go beyond the scope of 
this paper, whilst contributing little of relevance to the argument put forward.   
  
                                                          
15
 This problem has, for example, been identified by Eden’s biographer David Dutton. Cf. David Dutton, Anthony 
Eden. A Life and Reputation, London 1997, 214f. 
16
 Cf. Len Scott/Peter Jackson, 'The Study of Intelligence in Theory and Practice', in: Loch Johnson/James Wirtz 
(eds), Intelligence and National Security. The Secret World of Spies. An Anthology, New York-Oxford 
2
2008, 22. 
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1. The “Cold War in Whitehall” 
Since 1943, when the ultimate outcome of the war – the military defeat of the Axis Powers – 
had begun to appear on the horizon, the question of how to deal with post-war issues began 
to emerge. Consequently, the Post-Hostilities Planning Sub-Committee (PHP) of the Chiefs of 
Staff Committee was created in August 194317 to “provide some real thinking about coming 
events connected with the eventual collapse of the enemy powers”18. The PHP was a military 
sub-committee composed of officers of the three Armed Services. However, since the 
Foreign Office wanted to retain a grip on such a “body with foreign policy pretensions”19, it 
ensured that the PHP was chaired – “infiltrated” to use a Foreign Official’s expression20 – by 
a diplomat, Gladwyn Jebb. The Foreign Office were very suspicious of the PHP and the 
predominance of the Chiefs of Staff therein, believing that “they should not be the final 
authority”21 on assessments produced by the PHP. It was in and around the PHP and the 
Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee (JIC) that a hotly contested debate between the Chiefs of 
Staff and the Foreign Office regarding post-war assumptions took place. The cause of this 
debate lay in two almost diametrically opposed apprehensions of the future by the 
contestants.   
1.1 The Chiefs’ of Staff Post-War Appreciation 
The beginning of the Chief’s of Staff convictions that the Soviet Union would represent the 
post-war threat has not been precisely determined. Victor Rothwell, for example, depicts the 
Chief’s “unwillingness to [consider and] discuss post-war security issues on the grounds that 
                                                          
17
 The PHP succeeded the ‘Military Sub-Committee’, a much smaller body set up in 1942. Consisting of less able 
officers, it was described as ‘hopeless’ by JIC-chairman Cavendish-Bentinck. Cf. Aldrich, Hidden Hand, 50. 
18
 Lord Gladwyn, The Memoirs of Lord Gladwyn, London 1972, 131. 
19
 Aldrich, Hidden Hand, 50. 
20
 Ibid.  
21
 David Dilks (ed.), The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan, 1938-1945, New York 1971, 25 Feb. 1944, 608. 
Emphasis in the original. 
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they were too busy waging the war itself”22 until the summer of 1944. Richard Aldrich, on 
the other hand, asserts that already by 1943, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Field 
Marshal Sir Alan Brooke, had concluded that the Soviets were to be the next enemy, thus 
setting the tone for the whole military hierarchy23. Although Brooke did not – contrary to 
Aldrich’s claims – explicitly confide such feelings to his diary until the summer of 194424, 
there are clues hinting that the Chiefs did indeed begin to consider a post-hostilities Soviet 
threat in 1943. The prime indicator is, of course, the establishment of the PHP itself; even if 
the Chiefs thought themselves too busy to contemplate post-war problems themselves – yet 
– in August 1943 they did create a mechanism to deal with the problem and to report 
directly to them. The exact beginning of the Chief’s worries aside, it is clear that by the 
summer of 1944 they openly advocated their point of view25.  
The underlying assumption of the military planners was that the distribution of global power 
would determine the shape of and developments within the international system. The Chiefs 
realised that once Germany was defeated, only two truly great powers would remain: the 
United States and the Soviet Union. Yet, whilst war with the United States was 
inconceivable, given the “special relationship” between the two countries26, this was not 
quite so vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. On the contrary, Soviet hostility against weakened 
European states was considered a very real possibility27. Once they regarded an antagonistic 
Soviet Union as a possibility, the Chiefs proclaimed it their duty to engage in worst-case 
contingency planning for a conflict with Russia: 
                                                          
22
 Victor Rothwell, Britain and the Cold War, 1941-1947, London 1982, 114. Cf. also Martin Kitchen, British 
Policy towards the Soviet Union during the Second World War, New York 1986, 194ff. 
23
 Cf. Aldrich, Hidden Hand, 43. 
24
 Aldrich erroneously dates an entry of July 1944 back to 1943. Compare ibid. and Arthur Bryant, The 
Alanbrooke Diaries. Triumph in the West, 1943-1946, London 1965, 242.  
25
 Cf. Rothwell, Britain, 115ff. 
26
 The word was first used by Churchill in private communications in 1943. Cf. John Dumbrell, A Special 
Relationship: Anglo-American Relations in the Cold War and After, London 2001, 7. 
27
 Cf. Percy Cradock, Know Your Enemy. How the Joint Intelligence Committee Saw the World, London 2002, 32. 
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“No one would be better pleased than the Chiefs of Staff if a permanent solution 
to our military problems could be achieved by [friendship with Russia]. […] But it 
is the duty of the Chiefs of Staff to examine all serious eventualities. We cannot 
be debarred from taking into account the possibility that for some reason […] 
Russia may start forth on the path to world domination, as other continental 
nations have done before her.”28 
The Foreign Office were not persuaded by this, however, believing that the Chiefs’ behaviour 
could become a self-fulfilling prophecy, making “inevitable the very danger they are trying to 
avoid”29. For them, contingency planning was a mere pretext for engaging an old enemy 
once again. The Chiefs of Staff retorted that the diplomats “could not admit that Russia 
might someday become unfriendly”30.  
However – despite their claims to the contrary – by the summer of 1944, a number of factors 
had already driven the Chiefs’ appreciation beyond pure contingency planning and led them 
to believe in a hostile post-war Soviet Union. Anti-Bolshevism played an important role in 
the military planners’ thinking: An old enmity dating back to the Russian Civil War (1917-19) 
coupled with deep-rooted suspicions of the Soviets’ motives – suspicions that had been fed 
considerably by the Russo-German Non-Aggression Pact of 23 August 1939 – and a disgust of 
the Communist system led British military leaders to doubt in a peaceful and co-operative 
Soviet Union. If this anti-Bolshevism constituted the fertile ground, a number of more recent 
issues were the seeds from which post-war appreciations were to flourish: Throughout the 
existence of the wartime alliance between Britain and the Soviet Union, the relationship 
between the British military and their Soviet counterparts had been problematic. British 
personnel stationed on Russian soil was greeted with outmost suspicion and in a number of 
cases treated badly. All but every personal contact with Russian officials contributed to an 
impression of a paranoid and almost hostile attitude towards the Allies. This “ground level” 
                                                          
28
 Note by Chiefs of Staff, 2 Oct. 1944, FO 371/39080, TNA. 
29
 Wilson minute, 10 Aug. 1944, FO 371/40751A, TNA. 
30
 Bryant, Triumph, 208. 
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experience of British officers in Russia is best summarised by the final report of (liaison) No. 
30 Military Mission to Moscow: 
“[T]he general attitude of the Russian authorities towards the Mission has been 
unchanged throughout [the Mission’s four-year presence in Moscow]. This 
attitude may be summed up as ‘Get all the information you can, and give nothing 
– or at least, the barest minimum – in exchange.’”31 
In comparison to Churchill or Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, whose annoyance with the 
Russian behaviour was regularly offset by Stalin’s conviviality at personal meetings32, the 
Chiefs of Staff and much of the military hierarchy gained an impression of an ever-increasing 
hostility and ever-decreasing “collaboration”. The notion of Soviet mischievousness was 
exacerbated by their actions in Eastern Europe in the last phase of the war: Especially their 
unwillingness to support the Warsaw Uprising in September 1944 – or even to allow British 
support – cast a further shadow onto the Chiefs’ appreciation of the future33. 
As a consequence of these tendencies, the Chiefs became increasingly convinced that the 
Soviet Union would indeed represent a threat once the ongoing war had been won and that 
British post-war policy should be adapted accordingly. In July 1944, for example, Brooke had 
spent 
“an hour with the S[ecretary] of S[tate for War] discussing post-war policy and 
our policy in Europe. Should Germany be dismembered or gradually converted to 
an ally to meet Russian threat 20 years hence? I suggested the latter and feel 
certain that we must from now onwards regard Germany in a very different light. 
Germany is no longer the dominating power of Europe. Russia is […] and cannot 
fail to become the main threat in 15 years from now.”34  
Although at this point, the materialisation of the Russian threat is still considered to be some 
time in the future, the two central aspects of the military’s appreciation are already 
                                                          
31
 COS (45) 597, ‘Final Report of No. 30 Military Mission’, 3 Oct. 1945, CAB 121/467, TNA. 
32
 David Reynolds, From World War to Cold War. Churchill, Roosevelt, and the International History of the 
1940s, Oxford 2006, 242. 
33
 Cf. Kitchen, Policy, 32ff. 
34
 Alanbrooke Diaries, 27 Jul. 1944, 575. 
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identifiable: Firstly, the Soviet Union would represent the next main threat to Britain, and, 
secondly, Germany would have to be built up to become a bulwark against communist 
aggression. Over time, these convictions grew stronger and were pronounced more 
adamantly. They only changed as regards the timescale within which the manifestation of 
the Soviet threat was expected: Whereas Brooke in July 1944 had spoken of fifteen to 
twenty years, subsequent appreciations reduced the time-span to ten (November 1944)35, 
later to five years.  
As a result of their “anxiety stem[ming] from pure appreciation of the massive imbalances of 
power which would exist after the war”36, the military leaders began to advocate a policy 
increasingly reminiscent of Churchill’s 1918 demand to “Kill the Bolshie, Kiss the Hun”37 from 
mid-1944 onwards – to the annoyance of the diplomats whose views differed 
fundamentally. 
1.2 The Foreign Office and Its Post-War Appreciation 
Following some internal discussion, the first Foreign Office study regarding British post-war 
policy was undertaken by Gladwyn Jebb in the autumn of 194238. His “Four-Power Plan” 
conceptualised a world organisation wherein the United States, Russia, Great Britain and 
China39 would co-operate to exercise joint control. Anthony Eden adopted this scheme when  
laying down the Foreign Office approach in November 1942 and obtained the War Cabinet’s 
approval for the Four-Power Plan. Thenceforth, the plan’s two underlying assumptions 
would form the basis for Foreign Office thinking: Firstly, it was assumed that the Powers 
“would realise their world-wide interests and be both able and willing to enter into world-
                                                          
35
 Cf. PHP 27 (O) Final, 9 Nov. 1944,  CAB 81/45, TNA.  
36
 Julian Lewis, Changing Direction. British Military Planning for Post-War Strategic Defence, 1942-7, London 
2
2002, 336. 
37
 Cited from: David Carlton, Churchill and the Soviet Union, Manchester 2000, 5f.  
38
 Cf. Lord Gladwyn, Memoirs, 109ff. A first request for guidance had been made to the Chiefs of Staff in Feb. 
1942; cf. Lewis, Direction, 1.  
39
 Jebb, however, did not consider China to be on a par with the ‘Big Three’. Cf. Ibid.  
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wide commitments to prevent any other nation from again troubling the peace.”40 Secondly, 
the objective would be “to hold down Germany and Japan for as long a period as possible.”41 
This policy required a Soviet government willing to co-operate with the Western Powers, 
making it essential to overcome Soviet suspicions and convince them of the benign 
intentions of British and American policy. Christopher Warner, the head of the Foreign 
Office’s Northern Department and “leading light among British ‘co-operators’”42, bemoaned 
the “constant fuel for Soviet suspicion that we and the Americans in reality wish to see the 
Russians and the Germans bleed each other to the maximum and to shut the USSR out of 
the post-war settlement.”43 Consequently, he later cautioned his colleagues that “the most 
important point in securing Russian collaboration after the war will be to convince Russia of 
our determination to go with her in holding Germany down.”44 This view was upheld by a 
Foreign Office paper of April 1944 wherein it was stated that 
“the logical deduction seems to be that, provided the British Commonwealth and 
the United States do not appear […] to deprive Russia of the means of 
eliminating the menace from Germany […] [and] do not support a combination 
against her and give reasonable consideration to her views, Russia will welcome 
a prolonged period of peaceful relations. […] But this is based on the assumption 
that the Russians do not suspect us of having designs hostile to her security.”45 
The Foreign Office’s conclusion that the Soviet Government was “clearly ready to give co-
operation with the United States and Great Britain a trial”46 was based on two convictions: In 
the first place, diplomats – and especially those serving in Moscow – had begun to see Russia 
in a new light. The “Great Patriotic War” had induced a number of changes to Soviet life such 
as the re-opening of churches, a relaxation of party rule, and the resuscitation of old Russian 
                                                          
40
 Cf. Llewellyn Woodward, British Foreign Policy in the Second World War, Vol. V, London 1976, 3f. 
41
 Cited from: Ibid. 5.  
42
 Aldrich, Hidden Hand, 46. 
43
 Warner minute, 4 Nov. 1942, FO 371/31595, TNA. 
44
 Warner minute, 17 Jul. 1944, FO 371/40741A, TNA. 
45
 Foreign Office Paper on ‘Post-War Soviet Policy’, 29 Apr. 1944, FO 381/43335. 
46
 Ibid. 
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– as opposed to Bolshevik – traditions. These changes hinted at an evolution of the USSR 
away from the radical communism that had led her to be the international pariah in the 
interwar period. Although the diplomats admitted that negotiations with their Soviet 
counterparts were still arduous, they believed to have detected a real possibility for change 
– that the Soviet Union might after all become a ‘normal’ country47: “the wartime alliance 
encouraged the idea that ‘Russia’ (preferred to ‘the Soviet Union’) was entering its post-
revolutionary phase.”48 The revised image of Stalin, often referred to as “Uncle Joe” in the 
West, also contributed to this impression. Carefully portrayed by the Soviet propaganda as 
the wise, pipe-smoking patriarch of Mother Russia, the Georgian came to personify the 
Russians’ heroic struggle against the Nazi onslaught49. As noted above, he was especially 
charming at the wartime conferences of the “Big Three”. For example, Sir Alexander 
Cadogan, Permanent Under-Secretary of the Foreign Office, himself a man of “remarkable 
powers of judgment and lucid expression”50, confided to his diary after the Yalta conference 
in February 1945: “I have never known the Russians so easy and accommodating. In 
particular Joe has been extremely good. He is a great man.”51 
However, the diplomats did not solely indulge in speculation about future Soviet 
benevolence – they also predicted that the normative power of the factual would force the 
Russians to co-operate after the war: 
“The interests of the Soviet Union in peace and security, therefore, are very great 
and real. Until the ravages of the war are repaired and until the Soviet Union 
becomes a country which is actually, and not merely potentially, strong 
economically, it is reasonable to assume that the Soviet Government will 
                                                          
47
 Aldrich, Hidden Hand, 46.  
48
 Reynolds, World War, 220. 
49
 Cf. Aldrich, Hidden Hand, 46. 
50
 Dilks (ed.), Cadogan Diaries, xxvi. 
51
 Cadogan Diaries, 11 Feb. 1945, 708. Emphasis in the Original.  
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concentrate on a pacific policy. […] The S[oviet] U[nion] may be expected to co-
operate wholeheartedly in a system of collective security”52. 
The scale of destruction caused by the German invasion of the USSR was enormous: by the 
end of the war, the Soviets would have suffered some thirty million casualties, and large 
parts of European Russia were devastated not only by actual fighting but also by systematic 
destruction of property by the retreating armies – first by the Red Army, later by the 
Wehrmacht. The Soviet Union would need a breathing space in which to resuscitate its own 
strength. Until then, Russia would have to co-operate simply because she would be lack the 
power for a confrontational policy.  
Their optimism notwithstanding, however, the diplomats were very aware of the delicacy of 
their assumptions and the “pathologically acute”53 Russian suspicions which would be 
extremely hard to overcome. It was essential to cease any military planning against USSR, 
lest the Soviets learn of them and find their suspicions reinforced54, for these “plans could 
not be concealed from the Russians, who would retaliate in kind and could do so much more 
quickly and effectively and ruthlessly than we possibly could.”55 As Cadogan wrote in a 
minute of 4 July 1944, “there are many difficulties in the way of wholehearted collaboration 
between the Soviets and the countries of the West […]. However, there is no doubt that our 
own policy must be directed to co-operation: if it fails, it must not be through our fault.”56 
Two days later, Eden commented: “This is so. It is all very difficult, but at least we are 
convinced that we are trying to operate the right policy.”57  
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However, the diplomats retained their overall confidence in the feasibility of their proposed 
post-war foreign policy and their ability to integrate the Soviet Union into a system of co-
operation. Indeed, during the second half of the war, it had become such a firm “line of faith 
in the Foreign Office that the way to win Soviet friendship was to pursue a firm line towards 
Germany”58 that military officers increasingly began to wonder about the “dogged 
determination to cling to their forecasts”59 and their apparent failure to notice the obviously 
hostile behaviour by the Soviets60. The diplomats retorted that “the policy of building up our 
enemies so as to defeat our allies would seem […] to derive from some kind of suicidal 
mania”61. Instead, the wartime ally Russia had to be turned into a peacetime ally by invoking 
a joint intention: the prevention of any further German aggression. 
1.3 The Assumptions Debate – a Struggle for Intelligence Estimates 
In the early stages of the assumptions debate, there existed no solid knowledge on Stalin’s 
intentions: “both camps were arguing from profound ignorance.”62 Given the traditional 
Soviet secrecy – the Soviet Union was famously characterised by Churchill in 1939 as “a 
riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma”63 – this was not surprising. As a result of this 
opacity, however, intelligence estimates of the USSR and their conclusions regarding future 
Soviet behaviour became immensely important for the debate in Whitehall with both sides 
seeking to procure analyses to support their “basic assumptions for post-war planning”. 
Consequently, the JIC and the PHP became the battleground on which the antagonists 
fought, and intelligence assessments the clubs they wielded.  
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Initially, however, the Foreign Office’s “infiltration” of the PHP seemed to pay dividends, for 
on 12 October 1943, the PHP sought the JIC’s direction regarding its post-war assumptions. 
The JIC in turn, under Foreign Official Cavendish-Bentinck’s chairmanship, chose only to 
comment on an appreciation provided by the Foreign Office itself64. Hence, at this stage, the 
diplomats were able to exert considerable influence on the thinking of the PHP despite the 
latter being a military sub-committee to the equally military Chiefs of Staff Committee65. 
However, the Foreign Officals were still ill at ease with the potential predominance of the 
military: “Unfortunately, the PHP are an emanation of the C[hief]s of S[taff], so that their 
papers have to be submitted to these pundits […] It is ridiculous that a paper of this kind 
should […] go to the Chiefs”66. And indeed, within six months of the PHP’s existence, the 
debate on post-war policy assumptions came to a head67: Firstly, a JIC report about the 
“Soviet Policy after the War”68 mentioned – almost in passing – that a considerable part of 
the Soviets’ industrial base, safely located behind the Urals, would not need reconstruction 
after the war. This assessment threatened a key part of the Foreign Office’s rationale, 
namely the assumption that the USSR would have to remain peaceful and co-operative to 
secure herself a breathing-space69. Secondly, the Chiefs of Staff began to realise that the PHP 
was used for “political pipedreams”70 and raised the stakes by reformulating the terms of 
reference of the PHP. Whereas the PHP used to be responsible for questions put to it “by the 
F[oreign] O[ffice] or other Departments of State, by the Chiefs of Staff Committee or by the 
Joint Planning Staff”71, it was now to prepare appreciations “on the instruction of the Chiefs 
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of Staff”72. The reduced influence of the Foreign Office in the PHP is apparent. As a 
consequence of these two developments, the PHP presented a report on the “Effect of 
Soviet Policy on British Strategic Interests”73 which caused considerable alarm in the Foreign 
Office. Although it concluded that the “evidence at present available does not […] suggest 
that the desire for wholesale domination […] is in the mind of the Soviet leaders”, and that 
the best policy would be one seeking co-operation with the USSR, it also mentioned the 
possibility of Soviet hostility for the first time and evoked the need for contingency planning: 
“The general weakness of the countries of Europe after the war will leave a 
vacuum which the USSR, if she wishes, might be in a position to fill. It would be 
to our strategic disadvantage to leave her free to do so […]. We can only insure 
against it by close collaboration with the Western European States […]. The 
British Commonwealth should maintain adequate naval superiority and certainly 
no less than parity in the air [vis-à-vis the USSR].”74 
Both this report and the slightly updated follow-up paper produced on 6 June 194475 – D-
Day – were based on Foreign Office arguments drawn up in April76, but, to the regret of the 
diplomats, went beyond them77. By June it was evident that, contrary to Foreign Office 
plans, “an interdepartmental body had come into existence that predicted what conflicts 
could occur rather than which ones would occur”78. Thence, fearing the self-fulfilling 
prophesy, the diplomats increasingly detached themselves from the “wretched”79 PHP, 
wishing to give the military “all the rope they need to hang themselves”80. Gladwyn Jebb 
who had “rather faded out of [the] strategical picture”81 was withdrawn by the Foreign 
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Office in August 1944 when the PHP became the Post-Hostilities Planning Staff (PHPS) and 
was organised in analogy to the Joint Planning Staff (JPS)82. 
Having suffered a setback in the PHP, the diplomats concentrated on the JIC – the body 
which produced the intelligence estimates on which post-hostility planning was based83. 
Senior diplomats thus instructed JIC chairman Cavendish-Bentinck to act as a ‘roadblock’ and 
obstruct the military whenever possible: if he managed to draft JIC forecasts of future 
Russian intentions in a more optimistic way, the arguments of the Chiefs of Staff would be 
undermined84. Although Cavendish-Bentinck was sceptical about this (he had, in fact, been 
accused of “selling out to the military” by Christopher Warner85), he soon “delivered a 
masterly performance and steered JIC’s political forecasts back towards a reaffirmation of 
the idea of ‘co-operation’ and benign Soviet intentions”86 in a JIC report on “Russian 
Capabilities in Relation to the Strategic Interests of the British Commonwealth” of 22 August 
194487: Although the report recognised the Soviet ability to cause disruption in Europe, it did 
not predict that Russia would embark on an expansionist cause. By offering a “remarkably 
optimistic”88 assessments of benevolent Soviet intentions, the report constituted “rather a 
setback for the would-be drinkers of Russian blood.”89  
The diplomats also ensured that the final JIC report on Soviet intentions produced during the 
war continued to portray Russia as essentially peaceful. The report, concisely entitled 
“Russia’s Strategic Interests and Intentions from the Point of View of Her Security”90 had first 
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been drafted in October was circulated to the War Cabinet in December 1944. Whereas the 
report acknowledged that Russia possessed an intact industrial base and an economy 
“capable of supporting in the field armies substantially larger than any other power in 
Europe”91, it predicted that 
“[i]n the period after the war, Russia’s policy will be directed primarily towards 
achieving the greatest possible measure of security. She will […] wish to take 
every possible precaution against being invaded, however small that risk may 
seem to be. Russia has a further reason for seeking security: she will wish to raise 
the standard of living of her people to something more nearly approaching that 
of the Western Powers. To achieve this, she will need a prolonged period in 
which to restore the devastated areas.”92  
 
Clearly, by this stage, the assessment of Soviet intentions had been detached from that of 
her capabilities to act offensively – capabilities that even the diplomats could no longer 
deny93. Yet, the report proposes that although the USSR would be strong enough to 
dominate the entire continent, the Soviet leadership were likely to abstain from doing so 
because it had to satisfy newly acquired taste for Western comforts. Likewise, the report 
acknowledged that Russia would seek to dominate a series of states in Eastern Europe, but – 
honi soit qui mal y pense – only to serve as a “protective screen” against future invasion. The 
report’s assuaging assertion that “Russia will allow these countries independence so long as 
she is in a position to ensure that they pursue a policy that tends to protect her strategic 
interests”, is, accordingly, only a euphemism for nominal rather than real sovereignty94.  
Given the increasingly unfriendly behaviour of the Soviets, manifested in the failure to 
support the Warsaw uprising or their recognition of the Polish National Council (the Lublin 
Committee) as the legitimate Polish government – events which considerably worried 
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Foreign Secretary Eden – this report appears exaggeratedly optimistic. However, it still did 
reflect the predominant line of thought in the Foreign Office in late 1944 and early 1945: 
Russia had to be given the benefit of doubt; if she acted seemingly aggressively, it was 
because of her perennial quest for security and because of the suspicions the Western 
Powers failed to overcome. Consequently, the report concluded that 
“[w]hile […] Russia will not, in our opinion, follow an aggressive policy of 
territorial expansion, her suspicion of British and American policy will 
nevertheless continue to cause difficulty. […] Accordingly, Russia’s relations with 
the British Empire and the United States will depend very largely on the ability of 
each side to convince the other of the sincerity of its desire for collaboration.”95 
The treatment of Germany remained the litmus test of mutual sincerity, for if Britain and the 
United States could convince the USSR of their desire to suppress German (and Japanese) 
aggression, good relations could be maintained. 
Since the beginning of the “Cold War in Whitehall”, intelligence played an important role 
therein, both helping to shape the debate by providing assessments concerning the future 
behaviour of the Soviet Union, as well as being shaped by the struggle between the two 
opposing sides. As shown above, for example, the Foreign Office took an intense interest in 
“infiltrating” assessment and planning bodies in order to shape the forecasts produced by 
them.  
This interaction between intelligence, the contestants, and their points of view is also 
evident elsewhere: Since, as has been shown throughout this section, the overall assessment 
of Soviet behaviour rested to a tangible degree on the appreciation of Russian strength and 
capabilities, a certain kind of intelligence was likely to be affected by this struggle: the 
intelligence responsible for the analysis of “any information regarding the industrial [and 
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economic] development of a country which may throw light upon the extent of its potential 
armed forces effort or plans”96 – economic intelligence. 
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2 Economic Intelligence during World War II 
In 1943 it was judged that “[i]n the course of the war the field, the scope and the use of 
[economic] intelligence […] have continually grown, and the demands on it at the present 
time are growing more rapidly than ever before.”1 An analysis of this development of 
economic intelligence from its pre-war beginnings until 1944 vindicates this statement. It 
also shows that economic intelligence was predominantly oriented towards the Armed 
Services and geared to providing appreciations for them, contrasting considerably with the 
period beginning in January 1944, when – as will be shown in the subsequent section – the 
diplomats began to dominate economic intelligence.  
 
2.1 The Economic Intelligence Machinery Before the War 
Although intelligence needed for the enforcement of the blockade against Germany was 
collected during the First World War, no centralised apparatus for the provision of economic 
intelligence came into being2:  
“In the war of 1914-19 no Department was responsible for watching, in the 
light of all available evidence, the development and decay of the enemy’s 
power to fight, for noting economic symptoms of collapse, or for providing 
those who planned the Armistice and the Peace Treaties with the economic 
appreciations which they needed.”3  
In order to remedy this situation, the Advisory Committee on Trade and Blockade Questions 
in Times of War (ATB), an interdepartmental committee4, was set up in 1923. Its task was to 
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assess the vulnerability of foreign powers to economic pressure in times of war5. In 
December 1929, another body, the Industrial Intelligence in Foreign Countries (FCI) sub-
committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence (CID) was created upon demand of the 
War and Air Ministries who did not partake in the ATB6. Both committees were co-ordinating 
bodies whose main task was to facilitate the flow of existing information and reports from 
various government departments to its customers7. Since neither of the committees 
possessed a research staff for proper economic intelligence analysis, the FCI decided to 
create the Industrial Intelligence Centre (IIC) in March 19318. The IIC was founded to provide 
“any information regarding the industrial development of a country which may throw light 
upon the extent of its potential armed forces effort or plans”9. Major Desmond Morton – an 
officer of the SIS on loan to the Foreign Office10 –  became the head of the IIC, arguing 
strongly for both economic intelligence and economic warfare in the face of the total 
mobilisation of a nation’s resources in modern war11.  
Filling a gap in the existing intelligence capabilities, the IIC quickly became the authority for 
the analysis of economic intelligence acquired from the range of sources outlined above12. 
Although the focus of the IIC’s work had initially been upon the Soviet Union for testing 
purposes, it soon began to concentrate on German industrial developments following 
Hitler’s Machtergreifung, assessing the speed and direction of the German re-armament13. 
The IIC concentrated on the productive capabilities of the ‘military-industrial complex’ and 
the raw material situation of the Reich, but did not analyse the German economy as a whole 
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– as its name implied, the IIC, provided industrial, rather than economic intelligence 
proper14.  
Among the IIC’s customers were the Foreign Office15, the Treasury, and the three Armed 
Services, as well as the Economic Pressures (EP) Sub-Committee to the ATB, and the Air 
Targets Sub-Committee16. The IIC provided these customers with specific industrial 
intelligence analyses upon request. Apart from estimating the speed of German re-
armament, the IIC was mainly employed in discovering weaknesses and potential 
bottlenecks in the German industry, and, thus, prepare for economic warfare in the looming 
conflict17. 
In 1937, thanks to Morton’s energetic advocacy of its cause, the Centre became the sole 
agency responsible for the co-ordination of industrial intelligence on behalf of the Service 
departments, the FCI and the ATB18. However, the Services and other departments and 
agencies – as long as they forwarded all relevant findings to the IIC – could still engage in this 
activity19. The rise of the IIC and the overall development of a functioning economic 
intelligence apparatus, however, was hampered by the general state of the British 
intelligence scene which “was one of uncoordinated activity, a medley of ministries and 
organisations, each providing secret information, but operating with little reference to each 
other, often in a spirit of marked rivalry, and lacking any integrating or supervising 
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machinery.”20 The Services intelligence chiefs – although quick to comment the work done 
by Morton’s department – were distinctly uneasy about allowing a civilian organisation to 
foster21. Despite the military background of many IIC employees22 – “civilians to whom the 
Armed Services were prepared to listen”23 – the Services insisted that IIC reports be 
submitted to their intelligence branches before circulation24. It was not until November 1937 
that the IIC could circulate assessments throughout Whitehall without prior imprimatur by 
the Service intelligence staffs. 
Furthermore, the lack of an effective mechanism to integrate all intelligence available 
resulted in a piecemeal utilisation of economic intelligence: Each customer used only a 
portion of the intelligence that could have been provided by the IIC, leading to distorted 
conclusions and worst-case assumptions – the lack of any integration created an excessively 
gloomy overall picture25. Hence, “the IIC was a unique and modern-looking agency, but it 
cannot be said that the government used it very intelligently.”26 The JIC27 which had been 
created in June 1936 to co-ordinate the intelligence of the Armed Services28 and, thus, to 
remedy the situation, only had an inauspicious beginning, and, until the Foreign Office joined 
the sub-committee in the summer of 1939, remained a peripheral body29. The IIC had sent a 
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representative to its meetings since its foundation as an “honorary member”30, but Morton 
was increasingly irritated by the JIC’s lacking impact on policy-making until the outbreak of 
World War II – and even beyond31. 
2.2 The Economic Intelligence Machinery During World War II 
The beginning of the war, triggered by the German invasion of Poland, led to some 
considerable alterations of the economic intelligence machine. On 5 September 1939, the 
Ministry of Economic Warfare (MEW) came into being “for the purpose of exercising 
functions connected with the prosecution of any war in which His Majesty may be 
engaged.”32 The IIC was integrated into the MEW and formed the nucleus of the Intelligence 
Branch, the Ministry’s largest section33. Furthermore, in addition to the IIC, the MEW 
absorbed the ATB and FCI committees, thus uniting the three co-ordinating bodies of the 
pre-war economic intelligence machine under a single roof34. However, as Hinsley observed, 
“inter-departmental co-operation declined rather than improved on the outbreak of war”35: 
In the first place, it took considerable time to adopt methods of collaboration between the 
new ministry (and its intelligence department), and the existing intelligence organisations. 
Perhaps more importantly, however, the relationship between the Intelligence Branch and 
the Service intelligence departments was not formally defined. The Services – which had 
retained the right to analyse economic intelligence for themselves – were reluctant to give 
up the work they were doing to a new, untried ministry during the first months of the war. 
This made it harder for the MEW to assume the central role in the economic intelligence 
process, and resulted in a series of competing reports concerning the German economy by 
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the MEW, the Air Ministry or the War Office being forwarded to the JIC36. This “competition 
rather than collaboration”37 only began to be resolved when the dire need for centralised 
economic intelligence for strategic appreciations was realised at the highest levels38: In 
February 1940, the Minister for the Co-ordination of Defence ordered a joint JIC-MEW 
analysis of the industrial capacity of Germany39. This was followed by a meeting of the 
different intelligence organisations involved in the estimate of German manpower in April, 
which highlighted the need for better collaboration40. In May 1940, finally, the MEW was 
given a seat on the JIC, although it was only to sign those reports it helped to write41. The 
Ministry’s representative to the JIC was its Deputy Director-General – the head of the 
Ministry’s Intelligence Branch, Colonel Geoffrey Vickers42. It was at JIC level where 
“economic and political intelligence [were] combined with Service Intelligence in all 
appreciations made for the Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Planning organisation and commanders 
in chief.”43 When the Joint Intelligence Staff (JIS) – a body designed to take the burden of 
analysis off the JIC by preparing these appreciations– was established and attached to the JIC 
in May 1941, the MEW was present therein, too44. However, even then, co-operation and 
co-ordination of economic intelligence were by no means complete, and, consequently the 
MEW was regularly confronted with Service intelligence papers to which it could only add 
very hurried and unsatisfactory comments and it took until the summer of 1941 to master 
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these problems45. By then, the Ministry was represented on all inter-service committees 
including the Joint Planning Staff (JPS) of the Chiefs of Staff46.  
Within these bodies, economic intelligence was used for strategic appreciations, covering 
two main issues: Firstly, since “economic factors are bound to enter into the enemy’s 
calculations”47, economic intelligence was used to help predict German strategic moves. 
Indeed, as was shown, for example, by Hitler’s decision to launch Operation 
Blau/Braunschweig into the oil-rich Caucasus in 1942, economic considerations played a 
considerable role in German strategic decision-making48. Secondly, economic intelligence 
was used in an attempt to calculate the development of the Reich’s military strength and, 
thus, to determine the optimal timing for an Allied strategic offensive. In the same vein, 
intelligence was employed in order to forecast the military decline and collapse of Germany 
for want of resources49. These latter roles of economic intelligence became increasingly 
redundant during the war, however, because of the growing realisation that Germany would 
have to be defeated in the field50. 
Apart from the measures to improve the co-ordination of economic intelligence for strategic 
appreciations, steps were also undertaken to convince the Services to recognise the MEW’s 
intelligence branch as “the essential source of economic intelligence”51 for their own 
operational planning. This development is closely linked to the development of the MEW’s 
Intelligence Branch which had been divided into “Blockade Intelligence” and “Economic 
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Warfare Intelligence” (EWI) sections shortly after the start of the war52. Whereas the former 
was responsible for running an ever closer blockade of continental Europe, the latter “was to 
keep under constant observation the enemy’s economic potential for war with the object of 
assisting other branches of Intelligence in detecting in advance his possible intentions”53. Its 
very existence “was a proof that from the start the MEW wished to serve something more 
than the blockade, and hoped to become the servant of the Services […] and other agencies 
of government.”54 This policy was continued when Colonel Vickers took over Intelligence 
Branch (rechristened “Enemy Branch”55) in April 1941. Later that year, Vickers decided to 
reform the Branch and “to exclude so far as possible all functions bearing on neutral 
countries and to organise Enemy Branch as an enemy intelligence organisation designed to 
work with the Services and the assist MEW in so far as it needed intelligence about the 
enemy world to guide its operations”56: to fully transform Enemy Branch into the chief 
supplier of economic intelligence appreciations. However, the relation to the Service 
Intelligence Departments continued to be problematic, because the latter were unwilling to 
send liaison personnel to Enemy Branch, preventing the MEW’s analysts from optimising 
their “product” for their customers in the three armed Services57. The state of affairs was 
only slowly improved by developing closer ties to the Services’ Operations – rather than the 
Intelligence – Departments and by the creation of the Service Liaison Department in June 
194158. Furthermore, Enemy Branch was represented at the Intelligence Section 
(Operations) (IS(O)) – set up at the end of 1941 as a sub-section of the JIC59 in order to co-
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ordinate the demands for, and provision of, operational intelligence60 – as well as at the 
“Hartley Committee” for estimating German petroleum production and consumption, and 
the Inter-Services Topographical Department (ISTD)61. Thenceforth, Enemy Branch was 
increasingly able to act as the central provider for operational – as well as strategic – 
economic intelligence within the Government Machine, leading the MEW’s official historian 
to judge that     
“the story of Enemy Branch was one of growth and innovation throughout the 
war. Its energetic and resourceful staff had many striking achievements to their 
name, and they were successful in persuading the Service Departments to make 
use of the economic information that Enemy Branch could supply, instead of 
relying on their own Intelligence Directorates for information.”62 
Likewise, the continuing integration of economic intelligence into operational planning led a 
1944 memorandum circulated by the JIC to conclude that “Enemy Branch is not an inter-
service organisation in constitution, […] but it is […] in function […] providing intelligence and 
appreciations which the Services require”63 but which they cannot provide themselves. 
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3 Economic Intelligence and the “Cold War in Whitehall” 
As has been shown, throughout the war, economic intelligence developed an ever closer 
collaboration with the Armed Services: It grew in size and was increasingly incorporated into 
the Joint Planning and Intelligence mechanisms. However, despite being the prime 
beneficiaries of the services provided by economic intelligence, the Armed Services did not 
attempt to establish any formal or informal control over the economic intelligence 
machinery. Thus, in early 1944, the Foreign Office was able to take over Enemy Branch, 
which – although it would still provide operational intelligence to the Services – became an 
important tool in the assumptions debate. As will be shown, the re-organisation of economic 
intelligence took place in two distinct phases, each, albeit differently, supporting the Foreign 
Office’s stance in the “Cold War in Whitehall”.  
 
3.1 Economic Intelligence in Foreign Office Hands 
In November 1943, the chairman of the Committee on the Machinery of Government and 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, John Anderson, circulated a report written earlier that year on 
the “Demobilisation of the Ministry of Economic Warfare”1. This report had concluded that it 
would be “unfortunate if the Ministry’s economic intelligence organisation regarding Europe 
were hastily abolished”2 and that the permanent functions of the MEW – economic 
intelligence and the planning for economic warfare – should be retained after the cessation 
of hostilities on the continent. Whereas an embryonic, dormant structure would suffice for 
economic warfare, economic intelligence would continue to be required after the war, for   
“[t]here can be no doubt that a vast amount of economic intelligence, both 
industrial and financial, will be required both for the disarmament commissions 
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and, at least in the early period, for the civil administration of the enemy 
countries.” 
Anderson considered that “the balance of advantage lies in entrusting the [economic 
intelligence and economic warfare planning] functions […] to the Foreign Office”, although, 
in the long run, economic intelligence might be entrusted to the Cabinet Civil Secretariat3. In 
an explanatory letter, Anderson affirmed, however, that he regarded 
“it as axiomatic that the collection of such intelligence, its appraisal and digestion 
for the purpose of day to day FO work and also for the purpose of informing the 
other Departments, which […] are interested in the same field, should [in the 
future as in the past] be part of the Foreign Office’s responsibilities.”4 
These ideas reflected the Foreign Office’s aim voiced in a letter to the Parliamentary Under-
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Richard Law: “the Foreign Secretary should control 
foreign policy both in the political and economic spheres (they are, in fact inseparable).”5  
In its meeting on 6 January 1945 – with Foreign Secretary Eden and the Minister of Economic 
Warfare Lord Selborne present – the Committee on the Machinery of Government endorsed 
Anderson’s note, agreeing that by providing economic intelligence, the MEW “were doing 
work proper in normal times to the Foreign Office which should be transferred to the 
Foreign Office on the demobilisation of the Ministry or, if the Ministers so concerned agreed, 
at an earlier date.”6 The Ministers concerned did agree, and following an exchange of letters 
between Selborne and Eden7, Enemy Branch was officially transferred to the Foreign Office 
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on 6 April 1944, becoming the “Economic Advisory Branch” (EAB)8, with Colonel Vickers 
remaining its Director General9.  
The reason for Eden’s desire to take over Enemy Branch as early as possible had to do with 
post-war planning: He needed Vickers to head, and Enemy Branch personnel to run the 
Economic and Industrial Planning Staff (EIPS)10. In late 1943, the Armistice and Post-War 
Administration Committee (APC) had decided to establish a planning section to consider the 
economic aspects of a German armistice11 and to advise the Supreme Allied Commander 
(General Eisenhower) “as to how, in the economic field, he should make use of the wide 
powers to be conferred on him by the draft ‘Terms of Surrender’”12. The EIPS, thus, 
complemented the “Control Commission (Military Section)”, a body formed to provide 
planning for a future Control Commission of Germany13. In contrast to the Control 
Commission (Military Section), EIPS was a civilian body, with a number of government 
departments contributing to it, but without any Armed Service participation14. The Foreign 
Office became responsible for the administration of the EIPS and – as in the case of the JIC 
and, initially, the PHP – was to provide its chairman15. In order to accomplish this, the 
Foreign Office required the expertise of Enemy Branch which it regarded as “an essential 
reservoir of facts for the use of EIPS.”16 In fact, so urgent was the need that it was agreed to 
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make the relevant Enemy Branch personnel available to the EIPS before the full transfer had 
been completed or before even the new name of the Branch had been decided upon17. 
Consequently, in the following months, EAB.1, the department of EAB seconded to EIPS, 
became “an essential part of the organisation and driving force of EIPS”18, providing its 
chairman, staff and secretariat19. 
EIPS officially came into existence on 16 March 1944. Soon thereafter, it “developed rapidly, 
and became the focal point in Whitehall for co-ordinating economic policy in regard to the 
enemy world.”20 The post-hostility planning function of EIPS (and its associated economic 
intelligence apparatus) is apparent in a list of activities of the Staff drawn up in August 1944: 
(a) preparing economic directives for the Supreme Commander in ex-enemy 
territory;  
(b) formulating for the decision of Ministers issues governing our economic 
policy towards ex-enemies;  
(c) examining the economic implications of a policy of dismemberment;  
(d) formulating views on economic issues submitted by  
i) the British representative on E[uropean] A[dvisory] C[ommission] […]  
iii) PHP;  
(e) representing to the planners of the control machinery […] the economic 
policy which the control machinery will be required to implement”21. 
These activities permitted economic intelligence to have two kinds of impact: Firstly, by 
producing analyses and appreciations in order to carry out tasks (a), (b), (d) i) and (e) of the 
list above, economic intelligence facilitated the formulation and implementation of a British 
economic policy regarding Germany, and the deliberation with the wartime allies on such 
matters. For example, its assessments were used in negotiations with the Americans and the 
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Russians concerning the post-war reparations to be paid by Germany: An EIPS report of 15 
August 1944 which advised that it were economically dangerous to extort reparations unless 
Germany achieved trade surpluses22 shaped the British position at the Yalta conference in 
February 1945. At Yalta, the British standpoint differed considerably from the Soviets’ (who 
demanded a payment of $20 billion) and from the Americans’ (who were prepared to use 
the Soviet figure as a basis for negotiations)23.  
Secondly, however, it was through EIPS that economic intelligence also played an important 
role in the assumptions debate. 
On the one hand, economic intelligence provided information used by the PHP24 and by the 
JIC25. As has been described above, the eruption of the confrontation between diplomats 
and the military followed a JIC report that – based on economic intelligence – asserted that 
the Soviet Union’s industrial heartland would not require extensive reconstruction after the 
war26. Likewise, the JIC’s Report on “Russia’s Strategic Interests from the Point of View of 
Her Security” mentioned above draws very heavily on economic intelligence: more than half 
of the report consists of an economic analysis of the Soviet situation27. Indeed, the report 
concluded that among the reasons for the Russian endeavours to create a system of “buffer 
states” were the desire to protect her own mines and oilfields, and the tapping of Polish and 
Romanian resources not least to provide an adequate supply for the growing Russian 
population28.  
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However, economic intelligence and EIPS were also to play a more direct, very distinct and 
even dominant role in another engagement of the “Cold War in Whitehall “– the question of 
the dismemberment of Germany29. As has been outlined above, the question of the future 
treatment of Germany was the most antagonising and contentious issue in the debate 
between officers and diplomats: Whereas the Chiefs advocated an alliance with Germany to 
forestall Soviet aggression, the Foreign Office preached to foster co-operation with Russia by 
jointly controlling and suppressing Germany.  
On 9 September 1944, the Chiefs of Staff presented their point of view regarding 
dismemberment, having been asked to do so by the Foreign Office on 7 June30. They 
regarded the partition of Germany as a strategic advantage to prevent German rearmament 
and renewed aggression. Moreover, given the potential danger emanating from the Soviets 
after the war, Britain needed 
“all the help we can get from any source open to us, including Germany. We 
must above all prevent Germany combining with the Soviet Union against us. It is 
open to argument whether a united Germany would be more likely to side with 
the USSR than with ourselves. In any event, it is most unlikely that the USSR 
would ever permit the rearmament of a united Germany unless she were 
satisfied that she could dominate a Germany so rearmed. Thus, we are unlikely 
to secure help from the whole of Germany against the USSR. Our interests are 
therefore likely to be better served in this event by the acceptance of 
dismemberment, for […] this would give increased depth to the defences of the 
United Kingdom”31. 
The Foreign Office did not agree to this assessment, and economic intelligence supplied it 
with the ammunition to counter it, for on 2 September 1944, EIPS had produced a report on 
the economic aspects of a dismemberment of Germany following her defeat. It concluded 
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that a dismemberment would considerably reduce the German ability to pay reparations32. It 
would also result in an impoverishment of Germany, slow down the global recuperation 
from war damages, and, thus, harm British economic interests. In addition to this, aside from 
the fact that a complete economic dismemberment would not be achievable, even the 
attempt to impose it would significantly increase the burden on the Allied governments to 
control Germany and her economy. Finally, the report urged that, if a dismemberment was 
agreed to despite the economic objections to it, the policy could not be carried out 
immediately after the cessation of hostilities, since a number of central economic steering 
bodies were initially indispensable.  
Shortly afterwards, the Foreign Office produced a memorandum on dismemberment in 
which it weighed up both reports33. It concluded that the advantages of dismemberment 
claimed by the Chiefs of Staff were “illusory”34. In any case, since the Germans were likely to 
oppose such a policy, the Allies would have to be prepared to maintain the partition by 
force, a measure not likely to gain public support in Britain or the United States. Most 
importantly, however, the memorandum considered the effects of dismemberment on 
Anglo-Soviet relations and provided a lengthy comment on Chiefs’ of Staff position: 
“The argument seems to be that dismemberment could be used to keep 
Germany prostrate for just so long as it might serve our purpose, and that at a 
given moment we could suddenly reverse our policy and find in Western 
Germany a reliable ally prepared to reinforce our war potential and to join us in 
battle against [the USSR]”35.  
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Such a proposition, the diplomats remarked, seemed “little less than fantastic. But it is worse 
than that. It is playing with fire.”36 Instead of this, the policy of Britain should be to preserve 
the unity of the wartime alliance, a unity that would quickly be destroyed by such schemes 
of an anti-Soviet bloc. The memorandum did acknowledge that either course of action – a 
policy of dismemberment or one of treating Germany as a whole – had its dangers because 
the Soviet position was not clear. However, if the British Government were to agree to 
dismemberment, “acute differences are almost bound to arise in course of time over its 
policing”37. The policy would, thus, be to avoid a dismemberment but to make the British 
views “abundantly clear to [the Soviets], leaving no doubt in their minds that a soft peace is 
no part of our plan.”38 As long as the Soviets could be convinced that British policy was not 
directed against them, the diplomats saw “no reason to believe that the preservation of a 
united Germany would necessarily lead to a Russo-German combination.” On the contrary, 
the Foreign Officials expressed their view that a single Germany could become the glue 
holding the alliance together: 
“The more likely result of leaving Germany united would surely be to make the 
Russians more inclined to collaborate with us, always provided we remain strong 
and an Ally worth having. One can go further and suggest that the existence of a 
united Germany might prove a factor of the first importance in holding the Soviet 
Union and ourselves together.” 
When Foreign Secretary Eden passed this memorandum to the APC on 20 September, he 
was able to comment that although dismemberment should be considered if it really were in 
the interests of security, it did not appear to be the best policy to be pursued: Eden feared 
that, instead of providing additional security, dismemberment would automatically lead to a 
rupture of the wartime alliance once Germany was defeated: If Britain were to “prepare our 
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post-war plans with the idea at the back of our minds that the Germans may serve as part of 
an anti-Soviet bloc, we shall quickly destroy any hope of preserving the Anglo-Soviet 
Alliance”39. In conclusion, it seemed as if the partition of Germany “fail[ed] to advance the 
main object we have all at heart, viz., security from the German menace. That it would have 
grave economic disadvantages is clear from the report of the EIPS.”40  
Eden’s final remark illustrates the role played by economic intelligence in the dispute with 
the Chiefs of Staff. It provided the diplomats with a trump card, for even if they admitted 
that there was some merit to the arguments presented by the Chiefs and that the political 
consequences of dismemberment were ambiguous, they could refer to the fact that it would 
certainly entail severe economic costs: The benefits of dismemberment were very uncertain, 
whilst the economic costs would certainly be high.   
It was, thus, through EIPS and its assessments that economic intelligence came to play a role 
in the debate in favour of the Foreign Office’s point of view. Whilst it was seemingly 
unrelated to the political and strategic considerations that were at the centre of the dispute 
between officers and diplomats, EIPS – dominated by the Foreign Office since its foundation 
– came to promote the joint treatment and control of a united Germany, and, thus, 
supported the diplomats in the debate with the Chiefs of Staff. 
3.2 Economic Intelligence Dismembered 
As seen above, economic intelligence rendered valuable services to its new masters at the 
Foreign Office. Yet, by the end of the war, EAB was considerably shrunk and many of its 
departments were outsourced to other government bodies; it certainly appears ironic that 
the body which had considerably helped the diplomats on the question of dismemberment 
was now dismembered itself. However, the very fact that the Foreign Office retained at least 
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a small EI department – in spite of external endeavours to create a single, centralised body 
for economic intelligence appreciations – highlights the importance attached to economic 
intelligence and can be interpreted as an example of the diplomats’ desire to retain core 
capabilities and not entirely depend on the Cabinet or Chiefs of Staff machinery41. In 
addition to this, it will in fact be seen that this last wartime re-organisation of economic 
intelligence was a continuation of the “Cold War in Whitehall” by other means: Whereas 
other intelligence organisations, such as SIS, were transformed in accordance with the 
Chiefs’ of Staff point of view42, economic intelligence was – at least in the medium term – 
aligned according to the Foreign Office’s point of view43. 
The size of EAB (it employed some 350 officers44), and the plethora of tasks beyond the 
diplomats’ domestic needs that were performed for external customers instigated a process 
of decoupling parts of the economic intelligence apparatus from the Foreign Office. 
In January 1944, when the Foreign Office was awarded custody of the MEW, the Committee 
on the Machinery of Government had echoed the suggestions of its chairman Anderson and 
recommended that “[t]he central appraisal of economic information about all overseas 
countries should eventually be entrusted to a small section in the Cabinet Secretariat, 
working in close collaboration with the Departments concerned”45. By late 1944, a number 
of departments were indeed concerned: The Board of Trade, Treasury and others were 
worried that the Foreign Office might completely force them out of the business of overseas 
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economic appreciations46. An ambiguously worded letter by Sir Nigel Ronald, Acting 
Assistant Under-Secretary in the Foreign Office, exacerbated these worries in November 
194447. Aware of this, Ronald sought to convince his Whitehall colleagues that his 
“dominating motive [was] to avoid the accusation that he is taking over the Treasury or 
Board of Trade functions”48. He was not entirely successful in this, however, and 
representatives of the Treasury, Board of Trade, and the Ministry of Supply continued to 
press for an implementation of Anderson’s suggestions49.  
However, the size of EAB not only alarmed other government departments vigilantly 
defending their influence: It also worried senior diplomats who, whilst recognising the value 
of economic intelligence, believed that the future EAB “should be kept as small as possible 
and should devote its energies to appreciation and not employ a large staff on the collection 
of facts”50. This desire’s underlying motive was twofold: Firstly, the diplomats feared that 
their service might be swamped by the large number of personnel absorbed from other 
Whitehall departments towards the end of the war, for apart from Enemy Branch and the 
MEW, Eden wished to take over the Special Operations Executive (SOE) and the Political 
Warfare Executive (PWE). Secondly, they were worried by EAB’s tendency “to get more and 
more business for the firm”51 which was not Foreign Office work proper. This was also much 
to the annoyance of the Foreign Office’s Permanent Under-Secretary, Cadogan, who 
confided to his diary in November 1944:  
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“I am concerned at the general drift that the F[oreign] O[ffice] should take over 
all these fantastic things. We aren’t a Department Store. […] Are we competent 
to do so? We can’t do it, and we create new Dept[artment]s to grapple with it, 
isn’t that frightful duplication?”52 
Cadogan evidently feared that the Foreign Office would acquire organisations which far 
exceeded its own needs and were urgently required elsewhere, and would interfere with the 
core work of his beloved diplomatic service and “destroy any shred of reputation the 
F[oreign] O[ffice] may have retained”53. 
It was, thus, a combination of push and pull factors that led to yet another re-organisation of 
economic intelligence, and to a reduction of EAB’s size and tasks. Given the increasing 
success and efficacy of the JIC during World War II54, a centralisation of economic 
intelligence promised to soothe away both Whitehall’s and the diplomats’ fears whilst 
avoiding the “frightful duplication” lamented by Cadogan. In the long run, these 
considerations led to the foundation of the Joint Intelligence Bureau (JIB), a central body for 
the appreciation of economic and topographical information55. However, the JIB was not 
founded until mid-1946 (when the Foreign Office’s had changed its appraisal of Soviet 
behaviour), and even then, the Foreign Office retained its own economic intelligence body56. 
Moreover, as far as the immediate late-war re-organisation is concerned, there is 
considerable evidence to show that it was construed in a way to divide the existing 
economic intelligence apparatus among those institutions that would use them in 
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accordance with the Foreign Office’s post-war assumptions and, thus, help to carry out the 
post-war policy envisaged by the diplomats.  
On 8 December 1944 – following a number of meetings about the future of EAB, in which 
the Foreign Office’s permanent needs for economic assessments were established57, and in 
which the views of other departments were explored58 – it was decided to re-organise EAB 
once the “strategic and operational demands in regard to the European war”59 discontinued 
and the transformation of economic intelligence could proceed without interfering with its 
wartime work for the Armed Services60. EAB was split into three parts: Its first department, 
EAB.1, was to become the “EIPS Staff”. The seventh department of EAB, EAB.7 – which had 
previously been chiefly responsible for “General Economic Intelligence, Europe (including 
USSR)”61 – became the Foreign Office’s Economic Intelligence Department (EID), while the 
rest was ultimately passed on to the Control Commissions (OFFICES) for Germany and 
Austria62. By distributing EAB in this way, the Foreign Officials, whilst responding to outside 
and inside pressures to reduce the Foreign Office’s stake in external economic assessments, 
ensured that the economic intelligence apparatus would not fall into the wrong hands: EID 
remained firmly “with us”, as a Foreign Office circular laconically remarked63, and EIPS, 
repeatedly commended for its good and useful work64, continued to be chaired – and 
dominated – by the Foreign Office, which could still use it as a channel to promote its post-
war assumptions. The Control Commissions for Germany and Austria, lastly, were inter alia 
devised as a tool to ensure Germany’s industrial disarmament, denying her the capabilities 
                                                          
57
 Cf. for example, Minutes of Meeting, 14 Nov. 1944, FO 366/1391, TNA. 
58
 Cf. Minutes of meeting, 1 Dec. 1944, FO 366/1391, TNA. 
59
 Minutes of meeting, 8 Dec. 1944, FO 366/1391, TNA. 
60
 Cf. Minutes of meeting, 1 Dec. 1944, CAB 21/2562, TNA. 
61
 Cf. Telephone Register, FO 366/1493 
62
 Cf. Minutes of meeting, 8 Dec. 1944, FO 366/1391, TNA; cf. also Vickers, ‘Development’, 687f.  
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to engage in further aggression65. Furthermore, as inter-allied bodies, they epitomised the 
Foreign Office’s schemes for post-war co-operation and joint suppression of Germany. By 
providing the British element of the Control Commissions with parts of the economic 
intelligence machine, the diplomats, thus, ensured that it would be put to use against 
Germany in a joint effort with the Soviets. 
Moreover, this organisational re-deployment coincided with the functional alignment of 
economic intelligence for the post-war period: Since mid-1944, members of EAB had argued 
for the maintenance “at least for so long as Germany is subject to restriction or control, a 
study of German economy sufficiently detailed to meet the demands […] for purposes of 
strategic and political planning”66. Furthermore, the influence of the Foreign Office’s 
anticipation of the future on economic intelligence is manifest elsewhere: Having argued 
therein that the Foreign Office should retain a department for economic intelligence, Vickers 
asserted that 
 “[a]bout certain countries we shall always require intelligence different in kind 
and degree from that which economic intelligence will normally deal. These are 
(a) potential enemies and (b) countries where economic information is 
inaccessible by ordinary means. The country most conspicuous in the first class is 
Germany, in the second class USSR.”67 
This statement and the following paragraphs, repeated in a second memorandum68, fully 
reflect the Foreign Office’s standpoint: Both Germany and the USSR will require special 
attention. Germany, because she will still have to be treated as a potential enemy. The 
Soviet Union “our inscrutable ally”69, in order to “make good the relative absence of 
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statistical and other material from reliable public sources” and better understand her 
motives and intentions. 
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Conclusion 
Intelligence has been described as a “Cinderella service” and war as “the Fairy Godmother 
who changes Cinderella into the Princess.”1 This description seems to apply especially to the 
economic intelligence apparatus of World War II: Having grown into a sizeable and well 
functioning machinery during the war, it was dismembered and considerably shrunk as soon 
as – and even before – the clock struck twelve and the war was over. A number of diplomats 
– like the jealous step-sisters – seemed eager to reduce the size and influence of economic 
intelligence within the Foreign Office, wishing to reduce the number of economic 
intelligence officers from 350 (in EAB) to “six or eight”2 in the future EID.  
Was “Undank […] der Welt[en] Lohn”3? Blockade intelligence was a very labour-intensive 
task and, consequently, occupied the majority of the personnel employed by Enemy 
Branch/EAB. With the blockade’s raison d’être gone after the victory over Germany4, a 
substantial reduction of the size of the economic intelligence apparatus was justified. EID 
eventually employed 24 intelligence officers5, and although this seems small by the wartime 
standards of EAB, this still represents a considerable size – JIS, for example, which has been 
praised for its efficiency in providing the JIC with intelligence assessment, only comprised 10 
intelligence officers throughout the war6. Thus, the Foreign Office continued to field a well-
staffed economic intelligence machinery, albeit scaled down to peacetime requirements, 
reflecting the continuing value attached to it. Indeed, economic intelligence promised to be 
of great use in peacetime, a sentiment echoed by Lord Selborne who asked his fellow Lords 
                                                          
1
 Admiral Rushbrooke, Director of Naval Intelligence 1942-46, cited from: Aldrich, Hidden Hand, 65. 
2
 Minutes of Meeting, 14 Nov. 1944, FO 366/1391, TNA. 
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 Morton to Watson, 10 Sep. 1945, PREM 7/14, TNA. German in the Original.  
4
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 Cf. Radice to Ronald, 1 Jun. 1945, FO 366/1493, TNA. Three of them were concerned with the USSR and 
Eastern Europe – compared to four officers whose task it was to provide analyses regarding Western and 
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to “rejoice with me in the decision of the Foreign Secretary that henceforth the Foreign 
Office is to be adequately equipped in regard to economic intelligence, which must play an 
increasingly important part not only in foreign policy, but in all politics.”7 
The aim of this dissertation was to retrace the development of economic intelligence in the 
second half of World War II. It has been argued that the re-organisation of the economic 
intelligence machinery which took place in 1944 and 1945 has to be seen in the context of 
the debate between the Foreign Office and the Chiefs of Staff regarding the post-war 
planning assumptions, dubbed the “Cold War in Whitehall”. In order to put forward this 
argument, the paper was divided into three sections, the first two of them providing the 
indispensable pillars on which the synthesis presented in the third section could rest: Only 
by, firstly, providing an insight into the assumptions debate, and, by, secondly, establishing 
the role and development of economic intelligence during the war – a subject not 
academically covered before – could the re-organisation of economic intelligence in section 
three be adequately analysed. As this last section has shown, economic intelligence played 
both an active and a passive role in the assumptions debate: by breaking down its re-
organisation into two phases, it could be established that economic intelligence was, in a 
first phase, attached to the Foreign Office and used to support the diplomats in the 
assumptions debate, whereas, in the second phase it was taken apart and distributed in a 
way to support the policy envisaged by the diplomats.  
This process contrasted somewhat with the preceding wartime development of economic 
intelligence, for, until 1944, Enemy Branch had increasingly endeared itself to the Armed 
Services. The service functions provided by Enemy Branch did, of course, not cease with its 
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transfer to the Foreign Office8, but thenceforth, the development of economic intelligence 
was dominated by the diplomats. Because of the limited space available, however, the 
underlying reasons for this change could not be analysed – this task alone would fill a 
separate thesis. Likewise, the time period under scrutiny here only extended into early 1945, 
and did, thus, not include the Foreign Office’s changing appraisal of the Soviet behaviour. 
Since the Yalta Conference in February 1945, the “zenith of the wartime alliance”9, the 
relations between the Western Allies and the USSR deteriorated markedly. Consequently, 
the diplomats were increasingly forced to reconsider their post-war assumptions, although 
they were still annoyed by anyone outside the Foreign Office “expressing the doubts which 
they themselves felt.”10 This re-appraisal of Soviet intentions would culminate in “the other 
long telegram”, an extensive analysis of the malignant character of Soviet foreign policy sent 
to London from Moscow by Foreign Official Frank Roberts in March 194611, followed in April 
1946 by the foundation of the Russia Committee, the Foreign Office’s planning body for the 
(real) Cold War12. The analysis of this changing attitude and its impact upon economic 
intelligence would provide additional insights into the British Cold War machinery, the role 
of the Foreign Office therein, and, of course, economic intelligence itself during that conflict, 
thus helping to further explore the “missing dimension”. 
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